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Is the Cherry Sour? Why Doctrinal Borrowing Has Caused the Cherry
Doctrine To Converge with RICO Law *
Since Pinkerton, criminal law has long accepted the proposition that all parties
to a conspiracy are criminally liable for the acts of another conspirator so long as
those acts were reasonably foreseeable, in furtherance of the conspiracy, and
within the scope of the conspiracy. This proposition intersects with the Federal
Rules of Evidence in interesting—and constitutionally-suspect—ways,
particularly when considering the hearsay exceptions. The Tenth Circuit in
United States v. Cherry applied this coconspirator liability to the forfeiture by
wrongdoing doctrine under FRE 804(b)(6) such that a conspirator who
unlawfully renders a witness unavailable for trial foregoes not only the hearsay
objection but also the constitutional right of all coconspirators to confront adverse
witnesses regarding that witness’s out-of-court statement.
Within the limited scope of Pinkerton liability, this is intuitive. However, does
the logic apply when the conspiracy is alleged to have occurred under the
Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organization Act (“RICO”)? It should not,
but following the Fourth Circuit’s unpublished decision in United States v.
Adoma, the die has been cast to circumvent the rights of defendants because of
the acts of their coconspirators even when those acts were not foreseeable, in
furtherance, or within the scope of the conspiracy.
INTRODUCTION
Imagine that Jack has joined the Reds Nation, 1 one of our country’s most
notorious organized drug gangs. Jack, along with a small group, conspires to rob
a local laundromat owned by Bob. But, unbeknownst to the coconspirators, Bob
has equipped his business with security cameras that capture the entire crime.
After the robbery, Bob gives the recording to the police and intends to testify
against the coconspirators. The coconspirators, but not Jack, find out about the
recording and Bob’s plan to testify. They murder Bob to prevent him from
testifying at trial. Jack, however, neither had actual knowledge of the plan nor
did he participate in any aspect of the murder. Nonetheless, the prosecution

* © 2021 Dale A. Davis.
1. This Recent Development explores the issues arising when the crimes of one gang
member implicate another gang member due to conspiracy liability. See infra Parts II–III. To
demonstrate these issues, I have constructed an example using an invented gang. For more information
on crime statistics, see National Youth Gang Survey Analysis: Gang-Related Offenses, NAT’L GANG CTR.,
https://www.nationalgangcenter.gov/survey-analysis/gang-related-offenses [https://perma.cc/2C7USE44].
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successfully enters Bob’s proposed testimony into evidence against both the
coconspirators and Jack. Because of the Tenth Circuit’s holding in United States
v. Cherry, 2 when Jack’s coconspirators murdered Bob, they forfeited not only
their own Confrontation Clause rights and hearsay protections, but also Jack’s. 3
In other words, the Cherry court held that the criminal acts of a defendant’s
coconspirators may forfeit the Confrontation Clause rights and hearsay
protections of both the defendant and their coconspirators. 4
In the prosecution of organized drug trafficking crimes, the above scenario
demonstrates the frequent loss of constitutional protections for criminal
defendants. Together, the forfeiture of the right to confrontation guaranteed by
the Sixth Amendment, 5 exceptions to hearsay statements under the Federal
Rules of Evidence (“FRE”), and liability as a coconspirator established by
Pinkerton v. United States 6 all coincided to the detriment of the criminal
defendant in Cherry. 7 Under the common law forfeiture by wrongdoing
doctrine, a criminal defendant forfeits their right to confront an adverse
witness—the right afforded to them by the Confrontation Clause—when they
wrongfully render that witness unavailable for trial. 8 But under the federal
codification of the forfeiture by wrongdoing doctrine in FRE 804(b)(6) (“FBW
hearsay exception”), a defendant may also forfeit their right to a hearsay
objection at trial for the same action. 9 Therefore, a defendant who wrongfully
renders an adverse witness unavailable for trial may forfeit their hearsay
objection to the proposed testimony, their right to confront that adverse
witness, or both.
But the FRE also exclude the statements of a defendant from the rule
against hearsay. 10 Put simply, a defendant’s own statements may be entered into
2. 217 F.3d 811 (10th Cir. 2000).
3. This scenario is loosely based on United States v. Adoma, 781 F. App’x 199 (4th Cir. 2019),
where the Fourth Circuit considered similar facts. Id. at 202–04.
4. Cherry, 217 F.3d at 820.
5. U.S. CONST. amend. VI (“In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right . . .
to be confronted with the witnesses against him . . . .”).
6. 328 U.S. 640 (1946). For an explanation of Pinkerton coconspirator liability, see infra Section
I.A. The three Pinkerton prongs require a crime to be committed (1) in furtherance of the conspiracy,
(2) within the scope of the conspiracy, and (3) reasonably foreseeable to the coconspirators. Id. at 646–
48.
7. See Cherry, 217 F.3d at 820.
8. In Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145 (1879), the Supreme Court first recognized the
common law forfeiture by wrongdoing doctrine. Id. at 158.
9. Congress codified the Reynolds rule in FRE 804(b)(6), which provides a lawful exception to
hearsay. FED. R. EVID. 804(b)(6).
10. FED. R. EVID. 801(d)(2). Under the hearsay rules, the term “exclusion” is distinct from
“exception.” Certain types of statements are “excluded” from the hearsay rule as a necessary “result of
the adversary system rather than satisfaction of the conditions of the hearsay rule.” FED. R. EVID.
801(d)(2) advisory committee’s note on proposed rules. An “exception,” on the other hand, signifies
the “nonapplication of the hearsay rule, rather than [a] positive term[] of admissibility.” FED. R. EVID.
803 advisory committee’s note on proposed rules.
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evidence and used against them. And under FRE 801(d)(2)(E) (“the
coconspirator party opponent rule”), this exclusion is expanded to include the
statements that one coconspirator makes to another coconspirator when those
statements are offered into evidence against the defendant, even if the
defendant was not actually part of the conversation. 11 The prosecutor may offer
a coconspirator’s statement into evidence against the defendant so long as it was
made “during and in furtherance of the conspiracy.” 12 These criteria ensure that
any proffered statement actually reflects a defendant’s real involvement in the
alleged criminal activity.
The rule established in Cherry may be read as a logical extension, then, of
the coconspirator party opponent rule. In Cherry, the Tenth Circuit held that
the FBW hearsay exception incorporates Pinkerton coconspirator liability such
that a defendant forfeits their hearsay objection to an unavailable witness’s
proffered testimony when a coconspirator wrongfully renders that potential
witness unavailable for trial. 13 The Cherry doctrine holds, therefore, that (1)
under the coconspirator party opponent rule, the coconspirator’s hearsay
statement is admissible against the defendant; (2) under FRE 804(b)(6), the
hearsay statement by a witness rendered unavailable by the defendant is
admissible against the defendant; and (3) the hearsay statement made by a
witness rendered unavailable by the defendant’s coconspirator is admissible
against the defendant. 14
However, the Cherry doctrine is anything but a logical extension of the
coconspirator party opponent rule: it conflates the gravity of an evidentiary rule
governed by the FRE with that of a constitutional protection governed by the
Sixth Amendment. Each of the three rules comprising the Cherry doctrine—
forfeiture of Confrontation Clause rights, forfeiture of the hearsay objection,
and admission of a party’s own statement—requires a preliminary
determination of fact governed by FRE 104(a). 15 To admit evidence supporting
the forfeiture of confrontation rights or the hearsay objection, the proponent of
the evidence must prove before the judge, by a preponderance of the evidence
per FRE 104, that the defendant intended that their own action produce the
witness’s unavailability. 16 Similarly, the proponent of a coconspirator’s
11. FED. R. EVID. 801(d)(2)(E).
12. Id.
13. United States v. Cherry, 217 F.3d 811, 821 (10th Cir. 2000).
14. Id. at 820 (“We therefore hold that a co-conspirator may be deemed to have ‘acquiesced in’
the wrongful procurement of a witness’s unavailability for purposes of Rule 804(b)(6) and the
[forfeiture] by misconduct doctrine when the government can satisfy the requirements of Pinkerton.”
(citation omitted)).
15. FED. R. EVID. 104(a) (“The court must decide any preliminary question about whether . . .
evidence is admissible.”).
16. See FED. R. EVID. 104; FED R. EVID. 801 advisory committee’s note on rules—1997
amendment; infra Section I.C.
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statement offered against the defendant must prove, by a preponderance of the
evidence per FRE 104(b), that a conspiracy indeed existed between each of
these coconspirators. 17 Where each of these determinations previously required
separate procedural hearings, the Cherry doctrine allows a court to determine
merely by a preponderance of the evidence that a defendant has forfeited their
own Confrontation Clause rights when their coconspirator wrongfully renders a
potential witness unavailable for trial. The Supreme Court has nonetheless
accepted the Cherry doctrine’s validity, albeit tacitly, by refusing to grant
certiorari in subsequent Cherry doctrine cases. 18
Then, in the unpublished decision United States v. Adoma, 19 the Fourth
Circuit expanded Cherry by applying it to Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt
Organization Act 20 (“RICO”) conspiracy charges. 21 While the Cherry doctrine
applied explicitly to a Pinkerton conspiracy, Adoma expanded the Cherry doctrine
by finding that the less demanding elements of a RICO conspiracy satisfied the
coconspirator liability necessary to forfeit a defendant’s confrontation rights—
that is, the right to cross-examine or otherwise interrogate an adverse witness’s
statement. 22 This Recent Development, therefore, argues not that Cherry itself
was wrongly decided, 23 but that expanding the Cherry doctrine through Adoma
impermissibly dilutes the FBW hearsay exception by untethering it from both
its FRE 801(d)(2)(E) counterpart and the Advisory Committee on Evidence
Rules’ (“Committee” or “Advisory Committee”) rationale for FRE
801(d)(2)(E). 24
17. FED. R. EVID. 801(d)(2) (“The statement must be considered but does not by itself establish
the . . . existence of the conspiracy or participation in it . . . .”); see Bourjaily v. United States, 483 U.S.
171, 175–76 (1987) (“There must be evidence that there was a conspiracy involving the declarant and
the nonoffering party, and that the statement was made ‘during the course and in furtherance of the
conspiracy.’ . . . [T]he existence of a conspiracy and [defendant’s] involvement in it are preliminary
questions of fact that, under Rule 104, must be resolved by the court. . . . [W]hen the preliminary facts
relevant to Rule 801(d)(2)(E) are disputed, the offering party must prove them by a preponderance of
the evidence.”).
18. See, e.g., United States v. Thompson, 286 F.3d 950, 965 (7th Cir. 2002) (“[W]e follow the
Tenth Circuit’s decision in Cherry and hold that the waiver-by-misconduct of one conspirator may be
imputed to another conspirator.”), cert. denied, 537 U.S. 1134 (2003); United States v. Carson, 455 F.3d
336, 364 (D.C. Cir. 2006) (upholding Cherry in the D.C. Circuit), cert. denied, 549 U.S. 1246 (2007).
Although I disagree with the Cherry doctrine’s central premise that a criminal actor may forfeit their
Confrontation Clause rights through the acts of their coconspirator, I grant that the Cherry doctrine
(for now) is the current law for purposes of this Recent Development.
19. 781 F. App’x 199 (4th Cir. 2019).
20. Pub. L. No. 91-452, 84 Stat. 941 (1970) (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. §§ 1961–1968).
21. Adoma, 781 F. App’x at 203–04.
22. See id.
23. Although I believe that the Cherry doctrine wrongly forfeits the constitutional right of a
defendant to confront the witnesses against them, the Supreme Court has indicated its unwillingness
to decide the issue by denying certiorari in cases where courts have adopted the Cherry doctrine. See
supra note 18 and accompanying text. So instead, this Recent Development focuses on the appropriate
standard by which to determine Confrontation Clause forfeiture.
24. See FED. R. EVID. 801(d)(2)(E) advisory committee’s note on proposed rules.
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This Recent Development proceeds in four parts. First, it compares the
Advisory Committee’s rationale in creating the coconspirator party opponent
rule with both the rationale justifying the FBW hearsay exception and the
Tenth Circuit’s reasoning in Cherry. Next, this Recent Development explains
how the Cherry court used an agency theory of waiver to circumvent the
Confrontation Clause issue that arises when the coconspirator party opponent
rule is applied to Pinkerton cases. This Recent Development then explores the
Adoma decision and explains why applying Cherry to RICO charges
unjustifiably expands the Cherry doctrine at the expense of our criminal justice
system’s procedural and evidentiary protections. Finally, this Recent
Development argues that what Professor Jennifer Laurin terms “doctrinal
borrowing” 25 facilitated the incorporation of RICO conspiracy liability into the
FBW hearsay exception. But this borrowing ultimately untethered the
protections afforded by the Confrontation Clause from the FBW hearsay
exception’s rationale that one should not benefit from their own criminal
wrongdoing.
Instead of further expanding the Cherry doctrine as the Fourth Circuit did
in Adoma, this Recent Development argues in Part IV that the Cherry doctrine
should be limited by using a just and fair standard to apply the FBW hearsay
exception. Whereas courts currently determine by a preponderance of the
evidence the admissibility of evidence purporting to show a conspiracy or
wrongdoing intended to prevent a witness’s testimony, courts should instead
adopt a clear and convincing standard by which to judge such evidence.
I. THE ROOTS OF THE CHERRY TREE: PINKERTON, THE FEDERAL RULES
OF EVIDENCE, AND THE CONFRONTATION CLAUSE
First, it is important to disentangle the parts comprising the Cherry
doctrine. The Cherry doctrine extends the coconspirator party opponent rule by
attaching it to the FBW hearsay exception. But to understand how and why, it
is necessary to explain the bounds of Pinkerton coconspirator liability, the
hearsay rules and exceptions, the rationale of the Advisory Committee in
adopting the relevant rules, and the Confrontation Clause itself.
A.

Pinkerton Coconspirator Liability

The first prong of the Cherry doctrine is derived from Pinkerton, which
serves as the basis for common law conspiracy liability. 26 Under Pinkerton, a
25. See generally Jennifer Laurin, Trawling for Herring: Lessons in Doctrinal Borrowing and
Convergence, 111 COLUM. L. REV. 670 (2011) (discussing the doctrinal borrowing of qualified immunity
concepts in Fourth Amendment jurisprudence).
26. See United States v. Cherry, 217 F.3d 811, 816–18 (10th Cir. 2000) (analyzing the underlying
facts of Pinkerton, the application of Pinkerton coconspirator liability by lower courts and other circuits,
and the Tenth Circuit’s own precedent); id. at 818 (“We do agree [with the Eleventh Circuit’s
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defendant is liable for the actions of that defendant’s coconspirators when those
actions were (1) intended to further the conspiracy, (2) within the scope of the
conspiracy, and (3) reasonably foreseeable. 27 Today, the rule established in
Pinkerton enables the prosecution of organized crime—most commonly gangs
and drug organizations—because it reduces the degree of culpability necessary
for a particular defendant to be convicted. 28
In a three-person bank heist, for example, a getaway driver who never
entered the bank but absconded with the two robbers who did would be liable
for the substantive offenses of that pair. 29 If the two robbers battered a bank
teller by hitting the teller with their guns, then the driver would also be liable
for that assault if the assault was reasonably foreseeable and facilitated the
robbery. 30
B.

The Federal Rules of Evidence

The second foundational block of the Cherry doctrine, developed
independently of Pinkerton liability, 31 is the rule against hearsay. Statements
made outside of court, if offered to prove the truth of the matter asserted, are
hearsay and thus inadmissible into evidence, barring a specific exception. 32 A
statement made outside of court by one defendant to the defendant’s
coconspirators, therefore, is hearsay. 33 But the FRE exclude such statements

reasoning] that Pinkerton’s formulation of conspiratorial liability is an appropriate mechanism for
assessing whether the actions of another can be imputed to a defendant for purposes of determining
whether that defendant has waived confrontation and hearsay objections.”).
27. Pinkerton v. United States, 328 U.S. 640, 646–48 (1946). As noted in the Introduction, supra,
a court must find by a preponderance of the evidence under FRE 104(a) that enough evidence exists
for a prosecutor to even argue a Pinkerton liability theory before the jury.
28. See WAYNE R. LAFAVE, SUBSTANTIVE CRIMINAL LAW § 13.3(a) (3d ed. 2020) (explaining
that the Pinkerton Court “reconsider[ed]” the degree to which a criminal defendant’s act must “have
played a part in inducing or aiding the crime”). The LaFave treatise explains that “[c]riminal acts done
in furtherance of a conspiracy may be sufficiently dependent upon the encouragement and material
support of the group as a whole to warrant treating each member as a causal agent to each act.” Id.
However, Pinkerton has received mixed reactions from lower courts and state criminal justice systems
while the drafters of the Model Penal Code rejected the rule outright. Id. (“Most of the state statutes
on accomplice liability require more than [the Pinkerton elements.]”). But most importantly for this
Recent Development, “[t]he rule continues to exist in the federal system.” Id. (citing United States v.
Alvarez, 755 F.2d 830, 849–50 (11th Cir. 1985)). The Cherry court also cited United States v. Alvarez,
755 F.2d 830 (11th Cir. 1985), when deciding how to apply Pinkerton. Cherry, 217 F.3d at 817.
29. See Pinkerton, 328 U.S. at 646–48 (explaining the Pinkerton prongs).
30. See id. (explaining the Pinkerton prongs).
31. See generally John H. Wigmore, The History of the Hearsay Rule, 17 HARV. L. REV. 437, 437
(1904) (explaining that the rule against hearsay began in English common law in the 1500s).
32. FED. R. EVID. 801(a)–(c). The rule defines a “statement” as “a person’s oral assertion, written
assertion, or nonverbal conduct, if the person intended it as an assertion.” FED. R. EVID. 801(a).
33. See FED. R. EVID. 801(c). For purposes of this Recent Development, it is assumed that the
statement would be offered in court to prove the truth of the matter asserted.
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from the hearsay rule, consequently enabling party opponents to admit these
statements into evidence.
This category, FRE 801(d)(2) Admissions by a Party Opponent, names
five instances in which the statement made by a party itself (or someone found
to be speaking on behalf of the party) may be offered into evidence despite the
rule against hearsay. 34 This includes FRE 801(d)(2)(E), which permits the
introduction of an opposing party’s statement into evidence when that
statement “was made by the party’s coconspirator during and in furtherance of
the conspiracy.” 35
Instead of banning such statements, the Advisory Committee accepts their
admissibility as a necessary result of our judicial process’s “adversar[ial]
system.” 36 But admission of such statements does not occur without limitations.
The Committee excepted some statements made by one defendant to their
coconspirator under 801(d)(2)(E) along Pinkerton’s bounds by allowing only
those statements made “during the course and in furtherance of the
conspiracy.” 37 The Committee contrasted the coconspirator exclusion with the
FRE 801(d)(2)(d) agent/employee exclusion by arguing that, while the “usual
test of agency” justifies the agent/employee exclusion, 38 the “agency theory of
conspiracy is at best a fiction” that should not extend “admissibility beyond that
already established [by Pinkerton coconspirator concepts].” 39
The Committee could have adopted a broad rule generally inclusive of
statements one coconspirator says to the other without regard to any substantive
limitation. However, the Committee intentionally adopted Pinkerton’s “in
furtherance” requirement to protect the rights of defendants. 40 This hearsay

34. FED. R. EVID. 801(d)(2).
35. FED. R. EVID. 801(d)(2)(E).
36. FED. R. EVID. 801(d)(2) advisory committee’s note on proposed rules.
37. FED. R. EVID. 801(d)(2)(E) advisory committee’s note on proposed rules. The Advisory
Committee’s note to 801(d)(2)(E) does not explicitly mention the third Pinkerton prong of
foreseeability. Id. Nevertheless, a court must find by a preponderance of the evidence under FRE
104(a) that a conspiracy indeed existed between the defendant and their coconspirator for the hearsay
exception to apply. FED. R. EVID. 801(d)(2) advisory committee’s note on rules—1997 amendment.
Because a prosecutor shows this evidence of a conspiracy by proving the Pinkerton prongs, it stands to
reason by inference that foreseeability must be proven as well.
38. FED. R. EVID. 801(d)(2)(D) advisory committee’s note on proposed rules (“Was the
admission made by the agent acting in the scope of his employment?”).
39. FED. R. EVID. 801(d)(2)(E) advisory committee’s note on proposed rules.
40. 30B CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT & ARTHUR R. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE & PROCEDURE
§ 6777 (2020 ed. 2020) (“The adoption of Rule 801(d)(2)(E) and the rejection of the Model Code
Uniform Rule approach (which scrapped the [‘in furtherance’] requirement) should be viewed as
mandating a construction of the ‘in furtherance’ requirement protective of defendants . . . .” (quoting
United States v. Lang, 589 F.2d 92, 100 (2d Cir. 1978))).
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exclusion, the coconspirator party opponent rule, therefore mirrors the
limitations of the Pinkerton rule. 41
Despite the Committee’s effort to distinguish its reasoning behind the
employer/agent exclusion from that of the coconspirator party opponent
exclusion, tension exists between the legislative history and case law
interpreting the latter. The comments of the Senate Committee on the
Judiciary, for instance, express an intention to extend conspiracy liability only
in limited circumstances by reading into the coconspirator party opponent rule
that “a joint venturer is considered . . . a coconspirator for the purposes of this
rule even though no conspiracy has been charged.” 42 This means that the
substantive offense (and logical result of the conspiracy)—a robbery for
example—is all that a prosecutor needs to charge in a case against multiple
defendants who engaged in a joint criminal act in order for the prosecutor to
later use the conspirator party opponent rule. The prosecutor need not charge
“conspiracy” as well. But by that same token, “organized crime membership
alone does not suffice” to put this hearsay exclusion into play. 43 Accordingly,
the prosecutor instead must show that more than simply a conspiracy itself
exists and prove that the defendants pursued and acted upon a “specific shared
criminal task.” 44
C.

The Confrontation Clause and Forfeiture by Wrongdoing

The final Cherry doctrine subcomponent is the Confrontation Clause,
which intersects with the FBW hearsay exception. Like the party opponent
hearsay exclusions in FRE 801(d)(2), the FRE also provide for a hearsay
exception when the witness who would otherwise provide the in-court
statement is unavailable for trial. 45 The FRE specifically provide that “[a]
statement offered against a party that wrongfully caused—or acquiesced in
wrongfully causing—the declarant’s unavailability as a witness, and did so
intending that result” is admissible. 46 Thus, the Committee has explicitly
accepted the FBW hearsay exception. 47
In contrast to the coconspirator party opponent rule, the rationale
supporting the FBW hearsay exception originates not from the adversarial
nature of our criminal justice system, but from the deterrence theory of criminal
41. See Pinkerton v. United States, 328 U.S. 640, 646–48 (1946) (discussing the three
requirements for coconspirator liability).
42. FED. R. EVID. 801(d)(2)(E) note of the committee on the judiciary, senate report no. 93–
1277 (first citing United States v. Rinaldi, 393 F.2d 97, 99 (2d Cir. 1968); and then citing United States
v. Spencer, 415 F.3d 1301, 1304 (7th Cir. 1969)).
43. United States v. Gigante, 166 F.3d 75, 83 (2d Cir. 1999).
44. Id.
45. FED. R. EVID. 804.
46. FED. R. EVID. 804(b)(6).
47. See id.
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law. The Committee admitted as much by explaining that the FBW hearsay
exception identifies “the need for a prophylactic rule to deal with abhorrent
behavior ‘which strikes at the heart of the system of justice itself.’” 48 The Cherry
court similarly reiterated that the FBW hearsay exception ensures that a
criminal actor does not benefit from their own wrongdoing. 49 The deterrence
theory may also buttress Pinkerton liability: when one defendant engages in a
behavior that furthers the criminal act of a coconspirator, but where that
behavior standing alone is not a criminal act, the defendant should still suffer
the consequences of abetting the coconspirator. 50
However, this is where the Confrontation Clause applies: criminal
defendants must have the opportunity to confront adverse witnesses in court. 51
The FBW hearsay exception allows an adverse witness’s statement to be entered
into evidence against the defendant where the defendant wrongfully rendered
the adverse witness unavailable for trial. 52 A defendant who threatens,
intimidates, or harms a witness so that the witness cannot or will not testify
forfeits not only their hearsay objection to that witness’s statement—the FBW
hearsay exception—but also their right to confront, or cross-examine, that
witness at trial—the right protected by the Confrontation Clause. 53
The forfeiture of one’s right to confrontation has traditionally meant that
the defendant forgoes the opportunity to cross-examine that witness. 54 While
the Supreme Court first accepted that doctrine in 1878 in United States v.
Reynolds, 55 the Court did not elaborate upon or clarify the forfeiture of
confrontation rights doctrine until Ohio v. Roberts 56 was decided almost one
hundred years later. Roberts limited the types of statements admissible under
the forfeiture of confrontation rights doctrine to those with adequate “indicia
of reliability.” 57 This meant that so long as an unavailable witness’s testimony
proposed to be entered under FRE 804(b)(6) was sufficiently reliable, the
48. FED. R. EVID. 804(b)(6) advisory committee’s note on rules—1997 amendment (quoting
United States v. Mastrangelo, 693 F.2d 269, 273 (2d Cir. 1982)).
49. United States v. Cherry, 217 F.3d 811, 816 (10th Cir. 2000) (quoting United States v.
Houlihan, 92 F.3d 1271, 1279 (1st Cir. 1996)). The Fourth Circuit adopted this reading of the FBW
hearsay exception as well. United States v. Gray, 405 F.3d 227, 242 (4th Cir. 2005).
50. See LAFAVE, supra note 28, § 13.3(a).
51. U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
52. FED. R. EVID. 804(b)(6).
53. Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145, 158 (1878).
54. See Coy v. Iowa, 487 U.S. 1012, 1016 (1988) (“We have never doubted, therefore, that the
Confrontation Clause guarantees the defendant a face-to-face meeting with witnesses appearing before
the trier of fact.”); Mattox v. United States, 156 U.S. 237, 242–43 (1895) (“The primary object of the
[Confrontation Clause] was . . . cross-examination of the witness, in which the accused has an
opportunity . . . of compelling [the witness] to stand face to face with the jury in order that they may
look at [the witness], and judge . . . whether [the witness] is worthy of belief.”).
55. 98 U.S. 145 (1878).
56. 448 U.S. 56 (1980), abrogated by Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36 (2004).
57. Id. at 66.

N.C. L. REV. 847 (2021)

856

NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 99

proponent of that testimony could overcome the defendant’s Confrontation
Clause rights. 58
In 2004, the Court overturned the indicia of reliability standard in
Crawford v. Washington, 59 favoring instead a “testimonial” statements test. 60
While the Court struggles to define the scope of testimonial statements, 61 in
Giles v. California 62 the Court limited the instances in which a defendant forfeits
their confrontation rights to situations in which the particular defendant—not
just the coconspirator—intended to render the relevant witness unavailable for
trial. 63 Thus, for a defendant to forego both their objection to hearsay and their
Confrontation Clause right to cross-examination of the statement of an adverse
witness, the proponent of the statement must prove its “non-testimonial”
nature. 64
The Cherry court’s holding combined three previously unconnected prongs
into one doctrine. While Pinkerton established what is today recognized as
common law conspiracy liability, the Advisory Committee on Evidence Rules
enacted this common law into statute by drafting the coconspirator party
opponent rule. Similarly, the Committee’s drafters wrote the FBW hearsay
exception independent of Pinkerton and the coconspirator party opponent rule
because this exception, by its language, primarily affects individual actors. The
Cherry holding collapsed any empty space between these rules by applying
Pinkerton conspiracy liability to both the coconspirator party opponent rule and
the FBW hearsay exception.
58. See id.
59. 541 U.S. 36 (2004).
60. Id. at 59–61.
61. See, e.g., Williams v. Illinois, 567 U.S. 50, 58 (2012) (holding that even if a laboratory’s DNA
report had been introduced into evidence, it was not testimonial because it was produced to find a
rapist, not for the purpose of obtaining evidence to be used against the defendant); Bullcoming v. New
Mexico, 561 U.S. 647, 652 (2011) (disallowing the introduction of a laboratory report where the incourt testimony was not given by the scientist who performed the report); Melendez-Diaz v.
Massachusetts, 557 U.S. 305, 310–11 (2009) (describing affidavits as clearly testimonial in nature and
refusing to make a forensic evidence exception).
62. 554 U.S. 353 (2008).
63. Id. at 361 (“[U]nconfronted testimony [will] not be admitted without a showing that the
defendant intended to prevent a witness from testifying.”).
64. Imagine the following scenario: Jane intentionally renders an adverse witness, Jack,
unavailable for trial, and Jack’s prior written statement given to police is admitted into evidence
through FRE 804(b)(6). Before Crawford, to satisfy the dictates of the Confrontation Clause, the
prosecutor simply had to prove that Jane killed Jack to prevent his testimony at trial. See United States
v. Gray, 405 F.3d 227, 242 (4th Cir. 2005). But after Crawford, it could be possible that Jack’s hearsay
statement still satisfies United States v. Gray, 405 F.3d 227 (4th Cir. 2005), when that statement is
testimonial in nature because Gray does not require a defendant to have had the opportunity to crossexamine such a testimonial statement in the way that Crawford does. See Crawford, 541 U.S. at 59–61.
In such a situation, Jane may have a colorable argument that admission under FRE 804(b)(6) is proper
but that her Confrontation Clause right to cross-examination still precludes the statement from entering
evidence.
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II. THE TREE TRUNK: CHERRY
When the Tenth Circuit decided Cherry, it became the highest court to
decide how Pinkerton liability interacted with the coconspirator party opponent
rule’s precise language. 65 In Cherry, the federal government charged five
defendants with drug trafficking crimes based on information provided by an
informant. 66 Having learned of the informant pretrial, one of the five
defendants murdered him. 67 After the murder, the federal government sought
to enter the informant’s planned testimony against all five defendants under the
FBW hearsay exception. 68
On appeal at the Tenth Circuit, the government successfully convinced
the court that such testimony may be admissible for that purpose. 69 The
government essentially argued that because the defendants were jointly charged
for drug trafficking crimes committed through a conspiracy, the testimony of
the informant who was wrongfully rendered unavailable would have been
offered against all defendants. 70 The one defendant’s murderous actions,
therefore, forfeited not only his own hearsay objection but also that of his
coconspirators. 71 But because the same act—the murder of the witness—that
activates the FBW hearsay exception may also activate the forfeiture of the
confrontation right, the government supposed that the murderer’s action also
forfeited his and his coconspirators’ confrontation rights. 72
The Tenth Circuit agreed with the government. The court determined
that such a theory indeed exists whereby the acts of one conspirator forfeit not
only the coconspirators’ hearsay objections, but also the coconspirators’
Confrontation Clause rights: the agency theory of waiver. 73 Put simply, by
65. United States v. Cherry, 217 F.3d 811, 816 (10th Cir. 2000) (“We are aware of only one
published case interpreting the terms ‘engaged or acquiesced in wrongdoing’ since the recent
promulgation of Fed.R.Evid. 804(b)(6).”); id. at 818 (“We are unaware of any published opinions
adopting or rejecting a theory of agency based on Pinkerton liability in the context of the doctrine of
waiver by misconduct.”). For a discussion of the agency argument, see infra notes 73–86 and
accompanying text.
66. Cherry, 217 F.3d at 813.
67. Id. at 814.
68. Id. at 813.
69. Id. at 816 (“The government urges us to adopt the principles of conspiratorial liability
enunciated in Pinkerton v. United States, in the context of Rule 804(b)(6) and the Confrontation Clause
waiver-by-misconduct doctrine.” (citation omitted)); id. at 818 (“Therefore, we conclude that the
acquiescence prong of Fed.R.Evid. 804(b)(6), consistent with the Confrontation Clause, permits
consideration of a Pinkerton theory of conspiratorial responsibility in determining wrongful
procurement of witness unavailability . . . .”).
70. See id. at 815–16 (understanding the government’s position to be that the conspiracy
underlying the defendants’ actions rendered the unavailable witness’s testimony admissible).
71. See id. at 813.
72. Id. at 815–16.
73. See id. at 819. While the Tenth Circuit accepted that “[t]he right to confront witnesses is a
constitutional right personal to the accused,” it nonetheless determined that “there is room for an
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choosing to engage in a criminal act with a coconspirator, that coconspirator
becomes the agent of the defendant. To arrive at this conclusion, the Tenth
Circuit necessarily had to extrapolate from Pinkerton to the FBW hearsay
exception and then to the forfeiture of Confrontation Clause rights. First, the
court reasoned that “[i]t would make little sense to limit forfeiture of a
defendant’s trial rights”—the forfeiture of the 804(b)(6) hearsay objection—“to
a narrower set of facts than would be sufficient to sustain a conviction . . . .” 74
Therefore, so long as the prosecution satisfies the Pinkerton elements when one
coconspirator has unlawfully rendered an adverse witness unavailable, the
hearsay statement is admissible against all defendants. Second, the Cherry court
found that the word “acquiesce” as used in FRE 804(b)(6) allows for one
defendant to forfeit the rights of other coconspirators. 75 This “acquiescence
prong,” therefore, swallows the three Pinkerton prongs.
Furthermore, the Cherry court collapsed the distinction between the FBW
hearsay exception and the forfeiture of confrontation rights through its
interpretation of the word acquiescence as it is used in FRE 804(b)(6). 76 In
particular, the Cherry court read Pinkerton liability into the word acquiesce as
used in FRE 804(b)(6) by explaining that one who engages in a criminal
conspiracy acquiesces to the actions that a coconspirator takes on the group’s
behalf. 77 To get to this reading, the Cherry court first found that the phrase
“engaged or acquiesced in wrongdoing” supports the idea that “waiver can be
imputed under an agency theory of responsibility to a defendant who
agency theory of waiver” when one party is acting on another’s behalf. Id. (citing Olson v. Green, 668
F.2d 421, 429 (8th Cir. 1982)). However, the court noted that liability for the commission of a specific
intent crime by one defendant could not be imputed to other participants in the conspiracy because of
the due process limitations inherent to the Pinkerton doctrine. Id. at 818. Specifically, the Cherry court
reasoned that even though “violence may or may not be [a] foreseeable” consequence of a drug
conspiracy, that possibility alone is not enough to impute a specific intent crime such as intentional
homicide from one defendant to all coconspirators. Id.
74. Id.
75. See id. at 818–20.
76. See Adrienne Rose, Comment, Forfeiture of Confrontation Rights Post-Giles: Whether a CoConspirator’s Misconduct Can Forfeit a Defendant’s Right To Confront Witnesses, 14 N.Y.U. J. LEGIS. &
PUB. POL’Y 281, 305–06 (2011); see also United States v. Thompson, 286 F.3d 950, 964–65 (7th Cir.
2002) (agreeing with the Cherry dissent that membership in a conspiracy alone should not be sufficient
to establish waiver).
77. See Cherry, 217 F.3d at 820. This justification for the Cherry doctrine presupposes that a
criminal actor engaged in a conspiracy intends for their coconspirator(s) to render a witness unavailable
because both coconspirators benefit from the witness’s absence at trial. But this calls into question the
Cherry court’s assumption that forfeiture by wrongdoing and waiver by wrongdoing are equivalent
phrases. For a criminal actor to waive a constitutional right, they must know that the right exists. See
Nathaniel Koslof, Cherry Still on Top: How Pinkerton Concepts Continue To Govern Coconspirator
Forfeiture of Confrontation Rights Post-Giles, 55 B.C. L. REV. 301, 327 (2014). But for a criminal actor to
forfeit a constitutional right, knowledge of the right’s existence is irrelevant. See id. Thus, intent on the
part of the criminal actor is not relevant to the Cherry court’s analysis even though that court premises
its new doctrine on that assumption.
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‘acquiesced’ in the wrongful procurement of a witness’s unavailability but did
not actually ‘engage[ ]’ in wrongdoing apart from the conspiracy itself.” 78 The
Cherry court then incorporated the “in furtherance” and “within the scope”
elements of Pinkerton into that definition. 79
But the Cherry doctrine presumes an agency theory of conspiracy as
prescribed by Pinkerton. 80 While Pinkerton enables prosecutors—by an agency
theory—to charge one defendant with the substantive criminal offenses
committed by coconspirators, the Advisory Committee explicitly rejected
agency as a justification for the coconspirator hearsay objection. 81 Although
agency theory is sufficient to charge a defendant with the crimes of a
coconspirator (provided that the Pinkerton prongs are satisfied), a court may not
deprive the defendant of constitutionally protected liberty without a verdict
determined by a fair trial. 82 Therefore, the agency theory alone in that context
does not deprive a defendant of any constitutional right.
The Cherry court thus borrowed and incorporated Pinkerton liability by
reading the forfeiture doctrine under an agency theory of waiver. 83 Because the
waiver theory presumes the ability of the criminal actor to engage in the
conspiracy willingly and freely, the Cherry court found that Pinkerton
coconspirator liability would appropriately protect a defendant’s Confrontation
Clause rights but also prevent a defendant from benefiting from their wrongful
action. 84 The Cherry doctrine thus attempts to balance constitutional and law
enforcement interests.
78. Cherry, 217 F.3d at 816 (citing FED. R. EVID. 804(b)(6)).
79. Id. at 820. On the other hand, United States v. Thompson, 286 F.3d 950 (7th Cir. 2002), added
Pinkerton’s third “reasonably foreseeable” prong to limit Cherry’s applicability to only those defendants
that “actually acquiesced either explicitly or implicitly to the misconduct.” Id. at 965.
80. Cherry, 217 F.3d at 819 (“[T]here is room for an agency theory of waiver . . . . [where] agency
is inferred if an act is within the scope of the conspiracy, thereby resulting in the co-conspirator’s
individual liability under the substantive criminal law.” (citing Olson v. Green, 668 F.2d 421, 429 (8th
Cir. 1982))).
81. See supra text accompanying notes 37–41.
82. See U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
83. See Cherry, 217 F.3d at 818.
84. See id. at 820. By incorporating Pinkerton coconspirator liability principles, the Cherry doctrine
assumes (quite rightly, in most cases) that individuals who engage in conspiratorial criminal activity do
so in order to commit some type of criminal act. The Tenth Circuit created the Cherry doctrine by
analyzing the holdings of cases from three different circuits: United States v. Mastrangelo, 693 F.2d 269
(2d Cir. 1982); United States v. Houlihan, 92 F.3d 1271 (1st Cir. 1996); and United States v. White, 116
F.3d 903 (D.C. Cir. 1997). Cherry, 217 F.3d at 819. While the Second Circuit found that “[b]are
knowledge of a plot to kill [the witness] and a failure to give warning to appropriate authorities is
sufficient to constitute a waiver,” the First Circuit would have limited that holding by requiring “an
affirmative act by the particular defendant” before imputing waiver. Id. (first quoting Mastrangelo, 693
F.2d at 273–74; and then citing Houlihan, 92 F.3d at 1280). The D.C. Circuit, on the other hand, found
that “mere participation” in a conspiracy is “insufficient to constitute a waiver of a defendant’s
constitutional confrontation rights.” Id. at 820 (quoting United States v. White, 838 F. Supp. 618, 623
(D.D.C. 1993), aff’d, 116 F.3d 903 (D.C. Cir. 1997)). In the Cherry court’s view, the Second Circuit’s
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While the court read this agency theory of conspiracy liability into the
FBW hearsay exception through the term acquiescence, it also used that
acquiescence prong to read an agency theory of conspirator liability into the
Confrontation Clause. 85 The Cherry court accordingly applied agency to both
the forfeiture of the hearsay objection and the Confrontation Clause. Under the
Cherry doctrine, therefore, the actions of a defendant’s coconspirator deprive
that defendant of a constitutional right. But this unjustifiably combined what
the Supreme Court has held are two separate inquiries: (a) whether a
defendant’s engagement in a conspiracy has forfeited their hearsay objection,
and (b) whether that same behavior by the defendant has forfeited their
Confrontation Clause right. 86
Following Cherry, the Supreme Court has developed a jurisprudence
detailing how the FBW hearsay exception intersects with the Confrontation
Clause. 87 One of those cases, Giles, seemed at first to overrule Cherry. 88 This was
because the Court in Giles required a prosecutor to prove that a defendant
intended to render a witness unavailable for trial. 89 The Tenth Circuit in Cherry,
on the other hand, only required that the defendant’s coconspirator possess that
particular intent. 90 Under Cherry, therefore, the prosecutor need only show that
a defendant themself engaged in a conspiracy and that it was a goal or an act in
furtherance of that conspiracy to render an adverse witness unavailable for
trial. 91 However, as shown in the following discussion of United States v.
Dinkins 92 —a Fourth Circuit decision in a Cherry-doctrine case—Giles only
limited Cherry’s scope.
III. THE CHERRY TREE GROWS: FROM DINKINS TO ADOMA
Following the Tenth Circuit’s creation of the Cherry doctrine, several
other circuits, including the Fourth Circuit, have adopted its reasoning. The
D.C. Circuit adopted the Cherry doctrine in 2006, 93 and the Fourth Circuit
considered the issue for the second time in 2012 when it heard Dinkins. 94
However, the Fourth Circuit decided Dinkins post-Giles in a jurisprudential
rule was too broad and the First Circuit’s and the D.C. Circuit’s rules were too narrow. See id.
(“[I]nvolvement in a conspiracy may not be sufficient, standing alone, to waive confrontation rights,
[but] the White analysis is incomplete.”).
85. Rose, supra note 76, at 301–02.
86. See id. at 301–02, 302 n.103 (first quoting Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 68 (2004);
and then quoting Giles v. California, 554 U.S. 353, 361 (2008)).
87. See infra Part IV.
88. See Giles v. California, 544 U.S. 353, 361 (2008).
89. Id.
90. See United States v. Cherry, 217 F.3d 811, 821 (10th Cir. 2000).
91. Id.
92. 691 F.3d 358 (4th Cir. 2012).
93. United States v. Carson, 455 F.3d 336, 364 n.24 (D.C. Cir. 2006).
94. Dinkins, 691 F.3d at 384–85.
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context in which it seemed that the Supreme Court had effectively overturned
Cherry. 95 Nonetheless, Dinkins upheld Cherry and provided the Fourth Circuit a
launching pad from which to expand the Cherry doctrine.
Like Cherry, Dinkins concerned a conspiratorial drug trafficking operation
involving multiple defendants. 96 But where Cherry involved a small-scale drug
trafficking operation among five defendants, the organization in Dinkins was a
formal drug gang with a defined hierarchy, territory, and purpose. 97 When a
member of the gang became a government informant, the named Dinkins
defendant sought to murder the informant to render him unavailable for trial. 98
Like the Cherry court, the Dinkins court admitted the unavailable witness’s
hearsay statements pursuant to the FBW hearsay exception. 99
The Dinkins court, like the Cherry court, found that “traditional principles
of conspiracy liability are applicable within the forfeiture-by-wrongdoing
analysis.” 100 The Fourth Circuit found that the term acquiesce as used in FRE
804(b)(6) implies conspiracy liability because it includes “wrongdoing that . . .
is . . . attributable to [the] defendant because he accepted or tacitly approved
the wrongdoing.” 101 Again, like the Cherry court, the Dinkins court argued that
an agency theory of waiver connected Pinkerton coconspirator liability to the
forfeiture doctrine. 102 The Fourth Circuit went one step further, however, when
it found that the “application of Pinkerton liability standards” should be
“coextensive with the scope of forfeiture by wrongdoing.” 103
This reasoning enabled the Fourth Circuit to extend the Cherry doctrine
yet again in Adoma. In Adoma, the Fourth Circuit became the first court to
incorporate RICO charges under 18 U.S.C. §§ 1959(a)(1) and 1962(d) into the
FBW hearsay exception and the forfeiture of confrontation rights framework. 104
Although RICO premises criminal liability on an affiliation theory, whereby a
defendant exposes themself to liability simply by interacting with their
95. Giles v. California, 554 U.S. 353, 361 (2008). Because Giles requires a prosecutor to prove
that a defendant intended to render the witness unavailable for trial, it seemed that Cherry was overruled.
See supra Part II.
96. Dinkins, 691 F.3d at 362–63.
97. See id.
98. Id. at 364.
99. Id. at 384.
100. Id.
101. See id. (citing United States v. Thompson, 286 F.3d 950, 964 (7th Cir. 2002)).
102. See id. (“The principle underlying the Pinkerton doctrine is that ‘conspirators are each other’s
agents; and a principal is bound by the acts of his agents within the scope of the agency.’” (quoting
United States v. Aramony, 88 F.3d 1369, 1379 (4th Cir. 1996))). The Fourth Circuit gave particular
weight to the Cherry court’s approach to balancing the rights of a criminal defendant with law
enforcement’s need to prevent a criminal defendant from benefiting from their own wrongdoing. See
id. at 384–85.
103. Id. at 385. The Dinkins decision was issued four years after Giles, upon which the Dinkins court
based this coextensiveness argument. See id.
104. See United States v. Adoma, 781 F. App’x 199, 204 (4th Cir. 2019).
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coconspirator(s), it is unclear whether Pinkerton liability is proven by virtue of
RICO conspiracy liability or whether these are two distinct doctrines where the
latter is a broader category including within itself the former. 105 But as the
borrowing argument supposes, 106 it should come as no surprise that Pinkerton
and RICO conspiracy concepts would merge when combined with evidentiary
law.
Satisfaction of the elements of a RICO conspiracy, however, does not
satisfy the elements of a Pinkerton conspiracy. Instead, a RICO conspiracy
under 18 U.S.C. § 1962 only requires that a group of criminal actors endeavor
to further a criminal enterprise, “even if the conspirator does not commit a
predicate act.” 107 While a Pinkerton conspiracy requires a defendant to commit
the predicate criminal offense of entering a “criminal affiliation” through which
the defendant is liable for the actions of their coconspirator, a RICO conspiracy
imposes liability for an inchoate offense 108 alone. 109 As compared with a
Pinkerton conspiracy, a RICO conspiracy imposes liability on a much broader
range of actions not foreseen by the Advisory Committee. 110 For example, one
prong of the Pinkerton doctrine requires a coconspirator to have acted in
furtherance of the overall conspiracy; under RICO, the prosecutor need only
show that the coconspirator “have possessed knowledge of only the general
contours of the conspiracy.” 111 Therefore, “a defendant not guilty of the
substantive offense may still be convicted of conspiracy if there is proof of an
agreement to commit the substantive crime.” 112 As a result, the opinion in
105. See Susan W. Brenner, Of Complicity and Enterprise Criminality: Applying Pinkerton Liability to
RICO Actions, 56 MO. L. REV. 931, 956–57 (1991) (noting that while “American law is loath to predicate
criminal liability upon ‘affiliation,’” doing so adequately combats the underlying concern of “aligning
with another or others to achieve some unlawful purpose”); id. at 956 n.132 (“A person may be found
to be ‘affiliated’ with an organization . . . when there is . . . a close working alliance or association
between him and the organization . . . .” (quoting Bryson v. United States, 396 U.S. 64, 69 n.7
(1969))). Some criminal court proceedings have identified Pinkerton liability as overlapping with
RICO, and civil court proceedings have done so as well. See Mark Noferi, Towards Attenuation: A New
Due Process Limit on Pinkerton Conspiracy Liability, 33 AM. J. CRIM. L. 91, 123–24, 123 n.183 (2006).
106. For an explanation of borrowing and convergence theory, see infra Part IV.
107. CGC Holding Co. v. Broad & Cassel, 773 F.3d 1076, 1088 (10th Cir. 2014).
108. An “inchoate offense” is “[a] step toward the commission of another crime, the step in itself
being serious enough to merit punishment.” Inchoate Offense, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (11th ed.
2019).
109. See Brenner, supra note 105, at 965–66, 974 & n.187.
110. Id. at 965 (“Federal law recognizes six varieties of affiliative liability: (a) aiding and abetting
commission of a substantive offense; (b) attempting to aid and abet commission of a substantive
offense; (c) aiding and abetting an attempt to commit a substantive offense; (d) conspiring to commit
a substantive offense; (e) conspiring to aid and abet the commission of a substantive offense; and (f)
Pinkerton liability [though not as part of RICO].”).
111. United States v. Zichettello, 208 F.3d 72, 100 (2d Cir. 2000); see Dean Browning Webb,
Judicially Fusing the Pinkerton Doctrine to RICO Conspiracy Litigation Through the Concept of Mediate
Causation, 97 KY. L.J. 665, 665 n.4 (2008).
112. Webb, supra note 111, at 666 n.4.
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Adoma distorts the reasoning of the Advisory Committee regarding the
coconspirator exclusion and unjustifiably conflates Pinkerton coconspirator
liability with RICO liability. The borrowing and convergence doctrine,
however, explains this extension.
IV. THE TREE OR THE FOREST? DOCTRINAL BORROWING AND
CONVERGENCE
As a preliminary matter, the codification of the common law coconspirator
hearsay exclusion in the FRE finalized the incorporation, or borrowing, of the
Pinkerton conspirator prongs into evidence law. 113 According to Professor
Laurin’s reading of the work of Professors Nelson Tebbe and Robert Tsai,
“borrowing” is “a strategy of doctrinal persuasion and transformation that
‘draws on one domain of . . . knowledge in order to interpret, bolster, or
otherwise illuminate another domain.’” 114 While the latter professors analyze
borrowing as a constitutional lawmaking strategy, borrowing occurs in the
public as well as private legal domain, both within and outside of constitutional
law. 115 As a consequence—or logical endpoint—of borrowing, the analytical
framework by which judges (or other legal policy and lawmakers) include
concepts of one legal discipline into another facilitates the convergence of
previously distinct legal fields. 116
Once one legal doctrine enters the sphere of another through borrowing,
that process “tend[s] to generate a cascade of pressure on doctrinal barriers,
prompting courts to engage in further blurring of the boundaries between
previously distinct legal arenas and to gradually move the target doctrine toward
a point of convergence with the source.” 117 This “‘hydraulic’ property” of
borrowing ensures that the one legal doctrine imported into the second exerts a
formative pressure such that both doctrines eventually coalesce. 118
Convergence, therefore, is a necessary and expected feature initiated by
borrowing, which itself provides judges and policy makers with an effective
analytical and rhetorical tool capable of reshaping the law.
However, the ultimate end of borrowing—convergence—does not
consistently lead to a more coherent legal theory. That dissonance is present in
Adoma. Although evidentiary law itself is not constitutional, the rules of
evidence (both federal and common law) implicate constitutional values,
particularly in criminal cases, because these rules subject the defendant to a
113. See Nelson Tebbe & Robert L. Tsai, Constitutional Borrowing, 108 MICH. L. REV. 459, 462–
63 (2010) (defining “borrowing” in the constitutional law context).
114. See Laurin, supra note 25, at 672 (quoting Tebbe & Tsai, supra note 113, at 463).
115. See id. at 741–42 (citing borrowing in copyright and trademark law).
116. Laurin, supra note 25, at 710.
117. Id.
118. See id.
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potential deprivation of liberty. 119 Accordingly, evidence law is also bound with
criminal law and has incorporated principles of criminal law within the rules
themselves. For instance, the coconspirator party opponent rule explicitly
adopts the criminal law concept of conspiracy liability. 120 Both the FRE and the
common law recognize that the “responsibility of the party” in making the selfinculpating statement to their coconspirator warrants that statement’s
admissibility into evidence. 121
Nonetheless, the forfeiture of confrontation rights explicitly implicates
constitutional considerations separate from evidentiary concerns. 122 While FRE
804(b)(6) provides the hearsay exception to the forfeiture doctrine, Crawford,
Giles, and their progeny explicate the forfeiture doctrine’s Confrontation Clause
considerations. 123 Although commentators at the time of Giles expected that
opinion to “effectively overrule[] . . . Cherry,” 124 that has not been the case. 125
Instead, Adoma shows that the Fourth Circuit is willing to expand Cherry’s
holding from applying Pinkerton coconspirator liability in the Confrontation
Clause forfeiture by wrongdoing context to include RICO enterprise liability.
Convergence nonetheless explains how the Adoma court reached its flawed
decision. First, the coconspirator party opponent rule created a hearsay
exception premised upon Pinkerton coconspirator liability. 126 This underscores
that a defendant is responsible for making self-inculpating statements to their
coconspirators because of the defendant’s inherent agency in making such a
statement. 127 This enabled the Cherry court to apply an agency theory of
conspiracy to the FBW hearsay exception: the court must hold a defendant
responsible for engaging in a conspiracy that rendered the witness unavailable
because of the inherent agency in joining that conspiracy. 128 But of course, the
119. See, e.g., Brandon L. Garrett, Constitutional Law and the Law of Evidence, 101 CORNELL L.
REV. 57, 58–60 (2015) (explaining the extent to which courts choose to uphold constitutional values
and disregard evidentiary rules when the latter conflict with the former); Alex Stein, Constitutional
Evidence Law, 61 VAND. L. REV. 65, 91–92 (2008) (arguing for the “constitutionalizing” of evidence
law to provide better procedural safeguards at trial).
120. FED. R. EVID. 801 advisory committee’s note on rules—1997 amendment (discussing
statements by coconspirators).
121. FED. R. EVID. 801(d)(2) advisory committee’s note on proposed rules (“[T]he responsibility
of a party is considered sufficient to justify reception [of the statement] in evidence against him . . . .”).
But, as noted, see supra Part III, the concept of “conspiracy” under FRE 801(d)(2)(E) is not limited to
criminal law because only a joint endeavor united by a common interest attaches liability for the hearsay
exclusion.
122. See Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 61 (2004) (“[W]e do not think the Framers meant
to leave the Sixth Amendment’s protection to the vagaries of the rules of evidence . . . .”).
123. See Giles v. California, 554 U.S. 353, 358–59 (2008); Crawford, 541 U.S. at 51–52.
124. Rose, supra note 76, at 318.
125. United States v. Dinkins, 691 F.3d 358, 383 (4th Cir. 2012) (“The Giles decision did not
materially alter application of the forfeiture-by-wrongdoing exception . . . .”).
126. See FED. R. EVID. 801(d)(2)(E) advisory committee’s note on proposed rules.
127. See id.
128. United States v. Cherry, 217 F.3d 811, 819–20 (10th Cir. 2000); see supra Part II.
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scope of that liability was limited by the three Pinkerton prongs: in furtherance,
within the scope, and foreseeability. 129
Since the enactment of RICO, a federal conspiracy common law has
developed in parallel to that of Pinkerton conspiracies. 130 But the broad,
overarching scope of RICO conspiracy liability dwarfs the scope of Pinkerton
conspiracy liability because RICO typically applies regardless of Pinkerton’s
scope requirement. 131 In particular, a defendant under RICO may be liable for
the acts of a coconspirator even without proof of the scope, foreseeability, and
in furtherance prongs of Pinkerton. 132 Moreover, substantive conspiracy or other
charges apply under RICO regardless of a defendant’s “commission of a
substantive offense.” 133 When a prosecutor brings a case hinged on Pinkerton
liability, they may either charge the defendant with conspiracy itself as a
substantive offense or simply charge the defendant with the crimes committed
by their coconspirator(s); but in either case, the prosecutor must prove the three
Pinkerton elements. 134 Otherwise, affiliative liability does not attach under
Pinkerton. 135 Therefore, the convergence of federal RICO conspiracy principles
with those of the common law Pinkerton prongs expanded the nature by which
a court may find a defendant to have waived their hearsay objection under FRE
804(b)(6) and, consequently, their confrontation right.
The convergence of Pinkerton with RICO conspiracy liability as
exemplified by Adoma also illustrates how borrowing can reduce procedural
protections for defendants because Adoma enables a prosecutor to use the FBW
hearsay exception by proving a conditional fact under FRE 104(b) (“the
conditional fact rule”). In the context of the Cherry doctrine, this necessitates
discussion of FRE 104(b) and the prosecutor’s burden of proof. 136 First, FRE
104(b) requires a prosecutor to prove the relevance of a conditional fact—or a
fact the existence of which necessarily depends on proof of some other fact—
only by a preponderance of the evidence. 137 When that conditional fact then
enables the prosecutor to use another evidentiary rule that depends on the proof
129. Cherry, 217 F.3d at 820.
130. See Webb, supra note 111, at 669–80 (discussing Supreme Court cases interpreting the RICO
statute).
131. See Brenner, supra note 105, at 960–70.
132. See Webb, supra note 111, at 665 n.4.
133. Brenner, supra note 105, at 966.
134. This is because FRE 104(a) first allows a prosecutor to show, by a preponderance of the
evidence, that a defendant engaged in a conspiracy under Pinkerton. FED. R. EVID. 104(a). Having
proven the conspiracy, the prosecutor may then show that that the defendant is guilty of the crimes of
their coconspirators by virtue of the conspiracy. See supra note 37 and accompanying text. Because
prosecutors have discretion regarding what charges to bring in a given case, this theoretical prosecutor
then may choose whether to charge criminal conspiracy.
135. See supra note 37 and accompanying text.
136. See supra Introduction.
137. FED. R. EVID. 104(b); Bourjaily v. United States, 483 U.S. 171, 175–76 (1987).
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of that conditional fact, this means that the subsequent use of the second rule is
possible through proof based on a preponderance standard. 138 In the context of
the Cherry doctrine, therefore, this means that a prosecutor need only prove a
Pinkerton conspiracy by a preponderance of the evidence before gaining access
to the hearsay and Confrontation Clause waivers.
The Fourth Circuit in Adoma then further expanded this logical chain by
applying the conditional fact rule to a RICO conspiracy. 139 As noted, a RICO
conspiracy (unlike a Pinkerton conspiracy) does not require that the defendant
commit a substantive offense or act in furtherance of the conspiratorial goals. 140
Therefore, proving a RICO conspiracy for purposes of the conditional fact
rule—with the ultimate goal of using FRE 804(b)(6) or arguing forfeiture of a
defendant’s Confrontation Clause rights—is even less protective of a
defendant’s rights than proving a typical Pinkerton conspiracy for purposes of
FRE 104(b). The Adoma court failed to account for this expansion of the
forfeiture doctrine when that court did not adequately determine the correct
standard by which to find the forfeiture of the defendants’ Confrontation
Clause rights. Although the majority rule in both federal and state court
proceedings determines whether the Pinkerton prongs are satisfied by a
preponderance of the evidence according to FRE 104(a), the minority—and
more appropriate—rule applies the clear and convincing evidence standard. 141
While the preponderance standard is appropriate for determining whether the
defendant has forfeited their hearsay objection under FRE 804(b)(6), that same
standard is insufficient to protect the defendant’s constitutional rights
guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment.
Because the right to confrontation is a constitutional guarantee and
“forfeiture of constitutional rights is generally disfavored,” a more equitable
standard would “resolve close cases in the defendant’s favor.” 142 This equitable
standard is that of clear and convincing proof, which a court would still evaluate
under FRE 104(b). Only by clear and convincing proof should a court find that
a defendant has engaged in a conspiracy through which the actions of a
coconspirator forfeited the confrontation rights of the defendant. The clear and

138. See FED. R. EVID. 104(b). For example, assume that a plaintiff wishes to enter a hearsay
statement for the truth allegedly made by a defendant. That statement is typically admissible under
FRE 801(d)(2)(A) as an “opposing party’s statement.” See FED. R. EVID. 801(d)(2)(A). But suppose
that there is a legitimate factual question as to whether a defendant truly made that statement (such as
some evidence tending to show a third person made that statement). Under FRE 104(b), the plaintiff
need only establish by a preponderance of the evidence that the defendant did in fact make that
statement in order to then invoke FRE 801(d)(2)(A). See FED. R. EVID. 104(b).
139. See United States v. Adoma, 781 F. App’x 199, 204 (4th Cir. 2019).
140. Brenner, supra note 105, at 960–70; Webb, supra note 111, at 665 n.4.
141. See Aaron R. Petty, Proving Forfeiture and Bootstrapping Testimony After Crawford, 43
WILLAMETTE L. REV. 593, 601–02 (2007).
142. Id. at 609.
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convincing proof standard should apply only to the Cherry doctrine when the
forfeiture concerns a defendant’s confrontation rights.
When the question is whether a defendant engaged in a conspiracy for
purposes of FRE 801(d)(2)(E)—which governs whether a party opponent’s
hearsay statements may be admitted—the court should continue to apply the
preponderance standard. This is appropriate in that context because no
constitutional right is at stake in the context of the coconspirator party
opponent rule. 143 Furthermore, an underlying RICO charge should only lead to
the forfeiture of a defendant’s Confrontation Clause rights by the Cherry
doctrine when the RICO conspiracy also satisfies the Pinkerton prongs. This is
because the scope of RICO conspiracy liability is well beyond that of Pinkerton.
Accordingly, the Adoma Court unjustifiably expanded the Cherry doctrine to
forfeit a defendant’s confrontation rights in the RICO context.
CONCLUSION
The Confrontation Clause demonstrates that the framers envisioned a
criminal justice system that is both fair and adversarial. While the
Confrontation Clause requires that criminal defendants have the ability to
confront the adverse witnesses against them, the Supreme Court has repeatedly
found that a criminal defendant may forfeit that right when they wrongfully
render such a witness unavailable for trial. 144 On the one hand, this preserves
the fairness of our criminal justice process by ensuring that such a defendant
does not benefit from their wrongful acts; on the other hand, this preserves the
adversarial nature of that process by admitting otherwise inadmissible
testimony. This forfeiture of confrontation rights by wrongdoing, therefore,
arguably serves legitimate governmental interests by preventing harms such as
witness tampering and murder.
But when a criminal defendant themself wrongfully renders a witness
unavailable for trial, they willingly choose to forfeit their own confrontation
right. That same logic applies to a Pinkerton conspiracy: a criminal defendant
who willingly entered into a criminal conspiracy deserves the punishment
garnered by the acts of the defendant’s coconspirators so long as the Pinkerton
prongs are satisfied. The fairness of our criminal justice system then enables a
prosecutor to argue under the Cherry doctrine that a coconspirator’s pretrial
murder of an adverse witness has forfeited not only the coconspirator’s
confrontation rights but also those of the defendant who did not participate in
the murder.
143. No constitutional right is at stake because the rule against hearsay itself is not constitutionally
created. See FED. R. EVID. 802. The only reason that the coconspirator party opponent rule may
involve constitutional concerns is to the extent that the rule allows admission into evidence of a
statement that would violate the Confrontation Clause.
144. See supra Section I.C.
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Removing the evidentiary and constitutional safeguards guaranteed to a
criminal defendant because of the actions of the defendant’s coconspirators as
defined by RICO, however, does not enhance the fairness of our criminal justice
system. Indeed, doing so detracts from that fairness. Whereas Pinkerton liability
requires the affirmative act of a defendant entering into a criminal conspiracy,
RICO conspirator liability attaches for inchoate offenses. Furthermore, such
RICO liability does not require a coconspirator’s criminal act to have been in
furtherance of the original conspiracy or to have been reasonably foreseeable to
the other defendants. Therefore, Adoma impermissibly extended the Cherry
doctrine beyond its Pinkerton bounds.
Only one remedy would maintain Cherry’s validity, as the Supreme Court
seems to desire. First, the Fourth Circuit should renounce its decision and other
circuits should refuse to adopt Adoma’s reasoning. 145 Second, courts should
adopt a clear and convincing evidentiary standard in Cherry doctrine cases. This
means that when holding the FRE 104(a) hearing, a prosecutor must prove to
the judge by a clear and convincing standard, and not by a preponderance of the
evidence, that a Pinkerton conspiracy existed. Only then may a prosecutor argue
that a coconspirator’s wrongful actions against an adverse witness forfeited the
confrontation rights of all coconspirators. This more accurately ensures that our
criminal justice system remains both fair and adversarial.
DALE A. DAVIS **

145. Because the Fourth Circuit chose not to publish Adoma, it has no precedential value.
Therefore, the next Fourth Circuit panel to take up a Cherry-type case could easily ignore the Adoma
holding.
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